The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can (...) only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in (...) the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new interpretation of Kant’s notion of consciousness of oneself as a Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse. My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without conceptual content and any structure. It (...) makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

Une grande partie du livre Kitāb al-inṣāf d’Avicenne ne nous est pas parvenue. Toutefois, le «paraphrase-commentaire » ayant trait à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, livre Lambda, chapitres 6-10 a été conservé dans deux manuscrits. En 1948 Badawi avait fourni une édition du texte arabe, qui, malgré ses mérites, est ouverte à des corrections importantes, comme le démontrent quelques exemples. En outre, une attention particulière est payée au problème de l’identification de la traduction utilisée par Avicenne. Un examen, bien que non exhaustif, (...) de différents cas donne à penser qu’il s’agit d’une version révisée de la traduction d’Usāth. Mais il est à noter qu’Avicenne n’hésite pas de modifier de temps à temps la terminologie en fonction de sa propre pensée. Enfin, des éléments novateurs se font jour, dont au moins deux s’expliquent par les particularités de la traduction arabe. Au niveau doctrinal, trois éléments de telle sorte ressortissent : 1. le rejet d’inclure l’argument du Premier moteur immobile comme preuve de Dieu dans un contexte métaphysique ; 2. la qualification de la dépendance de l’univers envers le Premier Principe en termes de « don d’être » , non de mouvement ; enfin, 3. l’affirmation que l’auto-connaissance du Premier Principe inclut la connaissance de toutes les choses.A large part of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-inṣāf has been lost. However, the section containing a « paraphrasis-commentary » of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book Lambda, chapters 6-10, has reached us in two manuscripts. Badawi, in 1948, has offered a printed edition that notwithstanding its merits is open to serious improvement as shown by several examples. Furthermore, the problem of which of the old Arabic translation Avicenna has used is dealt with in detail. The examined cases, although limited in number, point to a revised version of Ustāth’s translation. But it has to be noted that Avicenna now and then changes the terminology consciously in view of his own ideas. Finally, some innovative elements come to the fore, two of which, at least, are due to particularities of the Arabic translation. From the doctrinal point of view, three ideas do strike: 1. the fact that the proof of the Unmoved Mover is unacceptable in a metaphysical context; 2. the qualification of the dependence of the Universe on the First Principle as a “Gift of Being” , not as a motion; 3. the inclusion of the knowledge of all things in God’s self-knowledge. (shrink)

South Africa has been undergoing a process of transformation since the end of White minority rule in 1994. During this period, various employment and lifestyle opportunities have given rise to a growing Black middle class. Against this backdrop, the article draws upon an intersectional approach to corpus-assisted discourse studies in order to examine the construction of the BMC in a 1.4 million-word corpus composed of 20 mainstream Anglophone South African newspaper titles published between 2008 and 2014. With the help of (...) the corpus tool AntConc, the article investigates the collocates of ‘black middle class’, ‘black diamonds’, ‘clever blacks’ and ‘coconuts’, classifying results according to semantic categories in order to provide an idea of the multiple but nuanced representations of the BMC in contemporary SA. The analysis finds several lexically rich moralizing and paternalistic discourses that, in accordance with an intersectional perspective, enact a complex pattern of strategies that are simultaneously exclusionary and inclusionary. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy by Praśastapādācārya; includes a portion of the text.

Leibniz’s letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (probably of May 1671) has been misunderstood due to the neglection of Wedderkopf ’s preceding inquiry, which had been available in print in the series I of the Academy edition. The letter is so interesting because Leibniz has already applied in it elements of his arguments which he later uses to solve the theodicy problem.

MOHAMMED SA, WALTERS KL, LAMARR J, EVANS‐CAMPBELL T and FRYBERG S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 116–127 [Epub ahead of print]Finding middle ground: negotiating university and tribal community interests in community‐based participatory researchCommunity‐based participatory research (CBPR) has been hailed as an alternative approach to one‐sided research endeavors that have traditionally been conducted on communities as opposed to with them. Although CBPR engenders numerous relationship strengths, through its emphasis on co‐sharing, mutual benefit, and community capacity building, it is often challenging as well. (...) In this article, we describe some of the challenges of implementing CBPR in a research project designed to prevent cardiovascular disease among an indigenous community in the Pacific Northwest of the United States and how we addressed them. Specifically, we highlight the process of collaboratively constructing a Research Protocol/Data Sharing Agreement and qualitative interview guide that addressed the concerns of both university and tribal community constituents. Establishing these two items was a process of negotiation that required: (i) balancing of individual, occupational, research, and community interests; (ii) definition of terminology (e.g., ownership of data); and (iii) extensive consideration of how to best protect research participants. Finding middle ground in CBPR requires research partners to examine and articulate their own assumptions and expectations, and nurture a relationship based on compromise to effectively meet the needs of each group. (shrink)

"I shall here present my life," writes Descartes in Discourse on Method, "as in a painting" and my method "as a fable." Through the Eyes of Descartes demonstrates how a Cartesian aesthetics is interwoven in his thought. It brings together a variety of materials: his metaphysical writings and essays in natural philosophy, through to his letters, drawings, and printed images. Cecilia Sjöholm and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback seek to bring Descartes into dialogue with contemporary phenomenology as well as contemporary psychoanalytic (...) thought. They focus on how perception interacts with emotions and thought, and the way in which our gaze is directed toward limit-phenomena of beauty and fascination. In Through the Eyes of Descartes, Cecilia Sjöholm and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback counter the traditional picture of Descartes by presenting his work in an entirely different light: a Descartes of the arts, of sensibility, of inner images, and of imagination. (shrink)

Constructing Race on the Borders of Europe investigates the visual imagery (in painting, photography, prints, film, and design) of race construction primarily in Scandinavia and the empires of Austro-Hungary, Germany, and Russia at a time when the disciplines of ethnography and anthropology were expanding and publications on race were debating competing theories of biological, geographic, linguistic, and cultural determinants. These regions, while on the periphery of continental Europe, largely marginalized in the scholarship of nineteenth-century art history, and ignored by Edward (...) Said (Orientalism 1978), have been central locations for theorizing white identity and for containing diverse ethnic populations that have generated substantive ethnographic study and regional conflicts since the eighteenth century. This anthology explores art that engaged with ethnography and anthropology to shape visual representations of subordinate ethnic populations and material cultures, both indigenous (Roma, Sámi, Inuit, and Celts) and migrant or colonial (Muslims and Blacks), chiefly between 1850 and 1930, but extending into the early twenty-first century. The essays in this book contribute to postcolonial research by documenting colonial-style treatment of minority groups and by seeking to qualify binary systems through explorations of anomalies, complexities, and contradictions that emerge when seen from the perspective of the fine and applied arts. This book presents a range of different artistic voices that responded to ethnographic and anthropological information by producing images or objects that adopted, altered, or critiqued that information. The authors seek to uncover instances of connections and variability, to establish the fabricated nature of ethnic identity, and to challenge the certainties of racial categorization. (shrink)

Irréductiblement polysémique, l'appellation «littérature populaire» a pu désigner les «littératures de la voix», la littérature de colportage, ou encore les fictions imprimées de grande consommation. Dans tous les cas, les «littératures populaires» ont été opiniâtrement minorées par le canon culturel. Sans doute parce que, par-delà les alibis esthétiques, la condamnation des «mauvais genres» trahit l'inquiétude des élites face aux conséquences de la démocratie, en même temps que le déclassement de la «littérature industrielle» permet à la Littérature consacrée d'affirmer par contraste (...) sa singularité distinctive. On s'interrogera dès lors sur les logiques de champs dont la recherche universitaire est redevable, comme en témoigne la persistance de dichotomies notionnelles discriminantes, que l'hybridité des textes et des usages sociaux invalide pourtant constamment.Popular literature, a definitely polysemous form applies to types of literature involving voices, hawking, or else the printed fictions widely read since the advent of the serialized novel. In all cases, popular literature or popular types of literature have systematically been minimized by the cultural canon. Beyond the alleged aesthetic reasons, this condemnation of "irrelevant genres" betrays the elites' worried reaction to democracy and its consequences; at the same time, the downgrading of "industrial literature" contributes to conversely reinforcing the distinctive status of established and accepted Literature. How can one then justify the fields academic research is indebted to, as is shown by the enduring discriminatory notional dichotomies which are however constantly gainsaid by the hybrid nature of texts and by social habits? (shrink)

Introduction: philosophy of science in practice Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Article Pages 303-307 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0036-4 Authors Rachel Ankeny, School of History & Politics, University of Adelaide, Napier Building, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia Hasok Chang, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH UK Marcel Boumans, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Valckenierstraat 65-67, 1018 XE Amsterdam, The Netherlands Mieke Boon, Department of Philosophy, University of (...) Twente, Postbox 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3. (shrink)

What’s Darwin got to do with it? The role of evolutionary theory in psychiatry Content Type Journal Article Category Review Essay Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s10539-011-9301-3 Authors Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy Department, Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia Journal Biology and Philosophy Online ISSN 1572-8404 Print ISSN 0169-3867.

As is well known, the Kāśikāvṛtti is the oldest extant rule-by-rule commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. Two major commentaries on it are available, the Nyāsa from the eighth century and the Padamañjarī, most likely from the eleventh century. In this article we focus on the term pradeśa, which is a familiar feature of the printed editions of the Kāśikāvṛtti on the sañjñā sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. A closer examination, however, shows that the sentence “Xpradeśāḥ — X... ity evamādayaḥ” is (...) not met with in either of the two commentaries. This has consequences for our understanding of the textual transmission of the Kāśikāvṛtti. (shrink)

Le milieu universitaire, précisément le monde des enseignants-chercheurs, se trouve dans la nécessité absolue de s’approprier les nouvelles technologies de l’information ; en même temps, il est l’héritier d’habitudes épistémologiques séculaires. Cet article pose la question des pratiques présentes et émergentes dans les processus de documentation scientifique. Il s’agit d’une part de constater les éventuelles carences dénoncées par les chercheurs en matière d’accès à l’information, d’autre part de faire émerger tout un système de représentations sociales participant d’une culture informationnelle spécifique (...) influençant nécessairement les pratiques. Sur la base d’une analyse qualitative, nous mettons en évidence la nécessité, pour les chercheurs, quelle que soit leur discipline, de maintenir une relation « papier » avec les supports d’information. Cette relation traditionnelle permet de mieux appréhender l’innovation technique et de faire face aux potentialités offertes par les nouvelles sources d’accès à l’information. En outre, nous montrons que la définition même du métier de chercheur et son comportement face au traitement de l’information dépend de sa culture disciplinaire, selon qu’il appartient aux sciences humaines et sociales ou aux « sciences dures ».The university environment, where scholars and professors work, is faced with an imperative need to appropriate the new information technologies, but it has also inherited the epistemological habits of centuries. This article raises the question of current and emerging practices in the scientific documentation process. It seeks on the one hand to observe the failings exposed by researchers regarding access to information, and on the other hand to draw out the contours of a whole system of social representations relating to a specific information culture that necessarily influences practice. Based on a qualitative analysis, we show the need for researchers in any discipline to maintain « print » relationships with information media. This traditional relationship helps to gain a better grasp of technical innovation and to cope with the potential of new ways of accessing information. We also show that the very definition of the research profession, as well as researchers’ attitudes to information processing, depend on their disciplinary culture and whether they belong to the humanities and social sciences or to the « hard sciences ». (shrink)

Sale of Sperm, Health Records, Minimally Conscious States, and Duties of Candour Content Type Journal Article Category Recent Developments Pages 7-14 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9347-6 Authors Cameron Stewart, Centre for Health Governance, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia 2006 Bernadette Richards, Law School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia 5005 Richard Huxtable, Centre for Ethics in Medicine, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH UK Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Tina (...) Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 9 Journal Issue Volume 9, Number 1. (shrink)

According to relativism, these appearances of faultless disagreement are to be endorsed. According to moderate relativism, this can be done within the general Kaplan-Lewis-Stalnaker two-dimensional framework, in which the basic semantic notion is that of a sentence s being true at a context c at the index i: it may in effect be the case that s is true at c but false at c∗. According to indexical relativism, this is so in virtue of the content of sentence s at (...) c being different from that of s at c∗. (shrink)

Human rights and civil rights, Interpretations and construction of Law and ethics, Iran.

Islamic philosophy; philosophy, Ancient.

Abraham (Biblical patriarch); Muḥammad, Prophet, d. 632; Muslim scholars; Muslim leaders; biography; miscellaneous.

Comparative study of the philosophy of Cārvāka and David Hume, 1711-1776.